Paper for the Paul Ricoeur Society

In this paper I investigate metaphorical cognition, the specific way in which metaphor guides thinking and generates implications. Metaphor is a problem for philosophical thought, insofar its central operation, conflation, thinking of one kind of thing as another, reverses the central aims of conceptual thought, i.e., to collect and divide things into their proper kinds. Where conceptual thinking distinguishes kinds, metaphor conflates them. Hence when conceptual thinking is needed, metaphor is rightly banished, relegated to the status of error (category mistakes), or perhaps useful confusion (for its “emotional impact”). Nonetheless, metaphor is a pervasive, perhaps ineliminable feature of human language, and as recent work has shown, it appears to “guide” thinking itself. Like con-ception, con-flation is an act of col-lecting, gathering, but conflation gathers different kinds, not the same. In thought, what does this mean? Conflation thinks one as the other. It sees the one through the other, with the latter’s meaning and structure now present in the former. We say, My friend is carrying a heavy burden for the family. The friend’s complex relationships to his family are thought as an act of carrying a heavy load, now with the concrete structure of carrying things present (via conflation) in the relationships. This is meaningful, but it is not conceptual. It rests on conflation, which directly inverts the aims of conceptual thought. How does it work? If we set aside the privileging of conceptual thinking (the “natural attitude” of philosophy), we see that in metaphor concrete structures of meaning, not abstract categories or rules, serve as standards of meaning. Carrying something is a mundane concrete act, a familiar task, one that in no way stands as normative or special, something that can assist in thought about other things. And yet it clearly functions as a standard of meaning here. In conflating the family’s situation with carrying a burden, in thinking one as the other, the concrete structure of carrying a burden serves as a means by which something else, something very different, gains determinacy. We now see the family’s situation in a particular way (as carrying) that we can recognize. And it is this determinacy that enables us to play out the implications of the family situation. “Someone else should step in and carry the load for a while.” “He can’t hold on much longer.” “He’s faltering under the weight.” The conflation generates implications, both practical and cognitive. I argue that the key to metaphorical thinking is the conflation of one thing with another, and that its aim is to help characterize, not categorize, experience more concretely and specifically. Metaphors characterize what is indeterminate in experience, producing what Kant called the distinctness of things, a condition without which, he argues, actual elements of experience cannot be cognized. He argues that this making-distinct is the central task of reflective, not determinative, judgment. But instead of preparing something with a distinctive character for conceptual thought (as in the 1st Critique), metaphor employs the conflated elements to generate implications directly from the conflation. Metaphorical thought, metaphorical reasoning, then, is the playing out of the reflective distinctness produced in the conflation of a concrete structure (carrying) with the object of thought (the friend’s situation). “He is carrying a heavy load, so…” we reason, “he might not last much longer.”

Date

Fall 2024

Location

University of Chicago

Custom

The Rule of Metaphor: Standards of Meaning Rooted in the Concrete [Metaphor] is a calculated error, which brings together things that do not go together. --Paul Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 51. Metaphor has from the start been a scandal for philosophy, and for good reason. Metaphor rests on an act of conflation, understanding one thing in terms of another, thinking the one as the other. The scandal is clear: conflation violates the categories and rules by which cognition must proceed. Plato called the proper form of cognition dialectic, i.e., the collection and division of true kinds, a process that involves the elimination of conflation and its irrational mixing of natural kinds. Kant revealed such categories and rules operating transcendentally, at the a priori basis of experience as such. Experience and all cognition deriving from it are rooted in determinative judgment, he argued, the process by which categories and rules provide “from within” the essential, categorical and lawful structure of our experience and thought. But metaphorical thinking ignores all such dialectical or determinative considerations, flagrantly conflating things that are categorically distinct and ignoring any rules by which thinking must proceed. Metaphor asks us to think of one thing as another, to merge or mix what should, it seems, be kept apart in experience and thought. As Ricoeur puts it, Metaphor is an “impertinent predicate.” Insofar as metaphor constitutes a way of thinking, it represents a profound threat to philosophy, since metaphor is based on a central act, i.e., conflation, that seems to undermine the very principles of thought. Outside the philosopher’s demands and criticisms, however, metaphor is natural and easy—it is pervasive. As Mark Johnson’s work over the past several decades has shown, metaphor is in no way an exception in human language and thought. It is the rule, an absolutely ubiquitous and prominent feature of human experience at every level of meaning. But it has been a pariah to philosophy because, I suggest, it has always been judged by the standards of conceptual, determinative thinking. Philosophers reject it because it does not do what they want and expect of any cognition worthy of the name: namely, it does not function conceptually. And in this the philosophers are right. Consider the following ways in which metaphor defies conceptual standards of thought and meaning: 1) If thinking involves categorizing things properly, then metaphor, an act of conflation, is a dramatic failure. 2) If thinking means following a rule, i.e., carrying out some general principle within experience, metaphor falls short. There is no law of metaphorical thinking. 3) If thinking requires internal coherence and consistency among its results, metaphor clearly fails, as, one hand, it allows multiple, incompatible structures to inform a single idea (e.g., the idea of justice is understood variously as balance, blindness, give and take, etc.) and on the other hand allows a single concrete structure to inform a wide array of divergent subjects, (e.g., we think of balancing justice, duties, emotions, finances, interests). If there is any coherence to be found in metaphorical cognition as such, it can be only a very weak coherence, hardly what we would expect from conceptual thought. 4) If conceptual cognition means using abstract, general standards to provide meaning to concrete things, metaphor exhibits a very different logic, one in which the concrete, not the abstract, serves as the standard of meaning. It is the concrete structure of walking, for example, that allows us to think of our abstract reasoning as moving step by step. It is the concrete act of gardening, e.g., planting seeds and pruning trees, that allows a lesson taught today to eventually blossom in a student’s mind. Metaphorical cognition reverses the relation between the concrete and the abstract, with the concrete now providing the standard of meaning for the abstract. 5) Finally, in every case, metaphor is rooted in an act of conflation. It is thinking one as the other. We use this other—something concrete, not conceptual—to make sense of the one. Such conflation, rooted in the concrete, clearly contradicts what we mean by conceptual thought, as does the movement of metaphorical thought itself. If philosophy, beginning with Socrates, has repeatedly rejected metaphor because it is not discursive (and it clearly is not), is it possible that metaphor pursues different aims and possesses a different logic? Should we not return again to the phenomena of metaphor to ask: When we think metaphorically, what is happening, and what is achieved for thought? Setting aside this “natural attitude” of philosophy, namely, that all cognition must be grounded on determinative structures, can we discern in metaphorical cognition a different way of thinking? What might metaphorical thinking actually be, if not an error, a poor or confused effort at conceptual thought? In this paper I will argue that metaphor is a form of thinking that differs fundamentally from conceptual thought. It possesses different aims and therefore a different structure. Metaphor is a form of thinking that does not rely on concepts, i.e., categories, rules, or laws, for its meaning. While concepts are present in all experience, of course, concepts do not provide the essential meaning or logic of metaphorical cognition. Metaphorical cognition is, I suggest, based on a different cognitive act, that of conflation. Conflation is a concrete form of thinking that employs concrete things to make sense of other things. Its logic does not move from concept-to-thing but from thing-to-thing. Metaphor, I suggest, is a matter of thinking with things by conflating one with the other. When we conflate a contentious faculty meeting (aka a faculty meeting) with a tug-o-war, we gain a concrete structure with which to specify and play out the meaning of the meeting. When we conflate it with people rowing a boat in different directions, we get a different concrete structure generating different implications. When Socrates conflates civic justice with a large person, he employs a concrete structure, the person, to think about the city. If the city is a person, it needs strength for its sustenance. If the city is a person, it needs a head that is in charge. The conflation of one with another is meaningful, productive, and it helps us generate specific implications for thought. How can we understand this cognitively rich and productive form of thought, if it differs so dramatically from determinative, conceptual thought? We can find a familiar, non-conceptual form of thought, I suggest, in Kant’s notion of reflective judgment. This model, essential to Kant’s thought but often overlooked (beginning with Kant himself), describes a capacity for thinking that does not rest on concepts or other fore-structures for its meaning. Instead, it seeks to characterize the actual experience we have, its actual elements and features, by using other concrete elements as its standards of meaning. Aesthetically, we use one color to specify and characterize another color, and the conversely latter then to specify the former. Back and forth, reflection moves among the actual elements of experience, seeking ultimately a characterization of this actual manifold, what Kant calls its aesthetic distinctness. But, as Makkreel points out, this capacity for judgment is essential to all cognition. The story of Antigone shows this dramatically in moral experience, as Antigone is confronted with an actual situation in which two different moral duties clash. Her only recourse is to investigate the actual situation she is in, its particular features and details, so that it can be characterized in a way that conforms to one duty or the other. Scientific thought also requires such reflective work… As Rudolf Makkreel has recently argued, reflective judgment is a comparative form of thought, a process of understanding one thing via other things. But these acts of comparison are not merely about likenesses or superficial similarities. They are acts of conflation, using one to think the other. This is the genius of reflective judgment: devoid of conceptual rules, we are not without resources. We can use concrete elements of experience as standards by which other elements of experience are brought to greater meaning, are specified and characterized in meaningful ways. Reflection’s aim, Makkreel argues, is not to categorize or govern experience but rather to specify and make distinct what is indeterminate in it, thus preparing experience for further thought, whether conceptual or otherwise. Makkreel writes, Reflective judgment is, in short, a process of comparative specification, using one to understand the other, or characterization of the actual elements of experience. And this, we will see, is the primary function that metaphorical cognition plays in human experience. Through a process of complex and deep comparison, i.e., the conflation of one as another, metaphors use concrete things (not abstract or general structures) to make other things more distinct and thus amenable to thought. Metaphor is a form of thinking that characterizes or specifies experience for further thought. Reflective Judgment as a Form of Concrete Thinking We can here only summarize the basic structure of reflective judgment in Kant’s thought and point out two key features that have been overlooked. Reflective judgment differs from determinative judgment in two ways: 1) it does not rest on any concepts and 2) it moves, unlike determination, “from particulars to concepts.” Without the aid of guiding concepts, reflection engages particulars in experience and seeks to make sense of them. In the 1st Critique, this process provides concepts (their schemata) with something that, having become distinct enough, can potentially be subsumed. Makkreel argues that for Kant such reflective activity is essential to any cognition at any level. The manifold, the elements of the presentation, must always be prepared for thought, whether conceptual or not. The essential function of reflective judgment is to make a given presentation distinct. Distinctness (Deutlichkeit), however, is that consciousness by means of which the composition of representations also becomes clear” (AP27; 7:138). This is then explicated as follows: “in every cognition [for which both] intuition and concept are always required, distinctness rests on the order according to which the partial representations are combined” (AP27; 7:138) This is the kind of coordinative order that was referred to earlier as “aesthetic distinctness” and can be geometrically delineated when dealing with what is perceptually intuited. For Kant, who viewed determinative cognition as the sole source of knowledge, reflective judgment served to make presentations distinct for categorical or lawful cognition. And whereas the primary concern of the first Critique was the subordinative form of determinant judgment, the specifying procedure of reflective judgment is coordinative. In the 3rd Critique, however, in aesthetic judgment, the manifold we have specified reflectively does not engage with concepts but rather with a very different element, namely, the feeling that accompanies our reflective activity. We judge the beauty of the manifold in and through the actual character of the feeling that our reflective engagement possesses. As Lyotard emphasizes, this judgment is not an interpretation, a mediated act of cognition. It is what he calls tautegorical. The character of the one, the painting, is announced or known in the character of the other, the feeling. In the 3rd Critique reflective judgment is shown in its full autonomy from determinative judgment, no longer serving merely as preparation for concepts. If we examine this autonomous structure, I argue, we see two important dimensions of reflective judgment that are underappreciated. First, as Makkreel points out, reflective judgment is essentially comparative in nature and has as its goal the specification of experience. He writes: In aesthetic judgment, we see this with colors. In theoretical cognition, with scientific laws. What this shows is that reflective judgment is our capacity to use one thing as a standard of meaning for another, to conflate one thing with another. I grasp the specific character and hue of the yellow in and through the particular blue, and the blue through the yellow. I am not comparing the kinds of things they are but rather their actual, concrete character, using one to inform the other. Similarly, I am not comparing the different natural laws as kinds of laws but rather seeking to characterize each more specifically, more finely, via conflation with the others. I think the laws of atomic motion as relativistic laws, and I think the relativistic laws as atomic laws, seeking to find a characterization that can be used by thought. This is comparative conflation, specifying the meaning of one thing as another. Metaphorical Thinking as Reflective Conflation My claim is that metaphor exhibits the basic structure of reflective judgment as outlined above. It seeks the same aims, namely, the specification of experience, by the same means, the conflation of one element with another. Metaphorical cognition is not a conceptual act employing fore-structures of meaning to categorize or govern experience. Metaphor does not rely on concepts for its operations, and it does not result in conceptual, i.e., categorical or lawful meanings. Rather, it is our reflective capacity to bring what is indeterminate in an experience to greater specificity and meaning precisely by using other concrete elements of experience as standards of meaning. We specify something about a friendship when we conflate it with the concrete act of carrying a burden, or removing a barrier, or hitting a wall. We think the friendship as a journey that has hit a wall, just as Socrates thinks civic justice as a person with desires, courage, and intelligence. We conflate one with the other in order to characterize the one in a more definite, specific way. And this concrete specification, this reflective making-distinct, is something we can think about. We can play out the meaning of this moment in the friendship through the logic of a journey that has hit a wall. The conflation enables us to generate implications for experience, to think more carefully about this moment or about civic justice.

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